David Hume
Philosopher and Historian
Modern era
David Hume
Birth	26 April 1711
Deaths	25 August 1776
School / tradition	empiricism , skepticism
Main interests	Human sciences , logic , epistemology , aesthetics , religion , morality , history , politics
Notable ideas	Critique of causality , critical of me , induction , habit , belief
Major works	Treatise of human nature Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Influenced by	Skeptics , Locke , Newton
Influenced	Kant , Bentham , James , Husserl , Russell , the Vienna Circle , Popper
change

David Hume, born David Home in Edinburgh - 25 August 1776 ), philosopher , economist and historian , is one of the most important thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment (with Adam Smith and Thomas Reid ) and is considered one of the greatest philosophers and writers speaking English . Founder of empiricism modern (with Locke and Berkeley ), one of the most radical in his skepticism , he objected particularly to Descartes and philosophies Whereas the human mind to a point of view-theological metaphysics : it opened the way for the implementation of the experimental method to mental phenomena . Its importance in the development of contemporary thought is considerable: Hume had a profound influence on Kant , on the analytic philosophy of the early twentieth ^century and the phenomenology. We do not yet kept its long thought that the skepticism destructive, but the commentators of the late twentieth ^century have attempted to show the positive and constructive character of his philosophical project .

It was proposed to divide life into three periods of Hume . Although such divisions could comprise an arbitrary, this remains an mnemonic useful: a period of studies and tests that will run until early 1740 , an active period of travel and results from 1740 to 1769 and a retirement period of 1769 to 1776. Still, this concerns only its periodization life , his thought is however consistent from beginning to end, as evidenced by the fact that Hume says that the rewrite of his first book, A Treatise of human nature, is a question of shape, substance, ie its theses, remaining the same.

Born in Edinburgh of a family of minor nobility of Borders , David Hume is the youngest of three siblings. His father, a lawyer, died in 1714 , while Hume is in infancy. Hume's mother then left to live in Ninewells and raises his children with his brother. He comes into 1722 the college of Edinburgh , where his teachers and followers of Newton. Reading the Latin poets and English writers, though his family intends to pursue a career in law.

But in 1734 , Hume is a time of crisis he mentions in a letter to J. Arbuthnot. It is made of an "insuperable aversion to all things, except for studies in philosophy and general knowledge." Refusing to become a lawyer, with seizures of exaltation, he wins Bristol and tried his hand in trade, before traveling to France for almost 3 years, staying first at Reims , then 1735 to 1737 , to The arrow (in the Sarthe present). There, aged 26, he finished writing his Treatise of human nature. Back in London in 1737 , he published the first two books of the book in January 1739 , anonymously. This work is a failure with the public, the book fell stillborn from the press. " It is now considered one of the most important works of Western philosophy, although its author has denied.

After this failure, he joined his family in Scotland in 1739 , became acquainted with Henry Home and begins a correspondence with Francis Hutcheson. He published in 1740 an Abstract of the Treatise of human nature, then, to fall , Book III of the Treaty and an Appendix. The same year he made the acquaintance of Adam Smith. He published the first part of his Essays Moral and Political (composed of 15 texts) in 1741 in Edinburgh. The book is a success. There will be a second edition in 1742 , up 12 texts.

In 1744 , his candidacy to the chair of moral philosophy and tire of the University of Edinburgh is rejected, because the enemy that his thought has been worth it. Attacked on his philosophical positions, Hume responded with a letter from a gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh.

The same year he became the tutor of the Marquis of Annandale, whose health is deteriorating gradually. In 1746 he became secretary to General St. Clair and joined Vienna and Turin. He published his Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which do not meet much success.

He returned to Scotland in 1749 , wrote his speeches and his policies Research on the principles of morality, the latter being a partial revision of his treatise of human nature that Hume regards as his masterpiece. His reputation as a philosopher begins to sprout. In 1751 , he joined Edinburgh and published in 1752 his political speeches, work welcomed. The output of London's Research on moral principles is however a certain indifference.

In 1752 , he took the office of librarian of the body of lawyers of Edinburgh. This inspires the idea of a History of England. The first volume devoted to Stuart , however, is strongly and unanimously criticized. In 1757 he published at London's Natural History of Religion. The second volume of his History of England was released in 1756 , spent the period from the death of Charles ^I of England until the Revolution, then in 1759 , one on Tudors. The series ends in 1761 by the last two volumes, while meeting a success. He then retired to the countryside, thinking of a peaceful retirement.

Tomb of the philosopher.

However, he accepts a secretarial position at the Embassy of France offered to him in 1763 by the Earl of Hertford and he joins Paris. In 1767 he became charge d'affaires. He left this position in 1766 to be named undersecretary of state in London. He returned to England in the company of Jean-Jacques Rousseau , with whom he will fall out. The quarrel in the headlines across Europe informed. He returned to Edinburgh in 1769.

From 1775 , he began to feel the effects of an intestinal tumor that will win a year later, at the age of sixty-five.

The philosopher wrote a short notice autobiography shortly before his death. Anecdotally, his autobiography is full of details on the gradual increase of its heritage, from poverty to relative affluence. It ends with an analysis of his character: "sweet, master of myself, a cheerful and social, capable of friendship but very unlikely to hate, and very moderate in all my passions. "

Sources of thought Hume

Hume was an insatiable reader. Among his readings may be chosen as sources of his thought the ancient philosophy and essentially Stoic philosophy as it was transmitted mainly through the works of Cicero and also by the former skepticism and scientific thinking recently, as illustrated by the physical by the empiricist philosophy.

Influenced by Locke , Berkeley and by French philosophers such as Pierre Bayle and Malebranche , Newton, however, is that Hume borrows its method of analysis, as highlighted in the subtitle of his major work (test for introducing the experimental method in moral subjects).

The science of man

"... The science of man Is the only solid foundation for science The Other ..."

The general project of Hume is to establish a new way of studying the man , applying the methods of the sciences of nature. Although this new science of man appears historically after the other sciences, and help each of their methodology, it is for Hume basic science that allows us, if not explain, at least to describe the other sciences, and establish the extent of our knowledge :

"It is obvious that all the sciences, a more or less have a relationship to human nature, and, so far that one of them may seem to depart, she always comes back one way or another. Even mathematics, natural philosophy, and even natural religion depend to some extent the science of man, because they fall under the cognizance of men and are judged by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to say what changes and what improvements we could make in these sciences if we knew the full extent and strength of the human mind

The method Hume

For Hume, as for Newton, experimental science is inductive Pricipals and must be limited to the discovery of laws, constant relations which our reason can not penetrate the ultimate nature.

A genealogy

In line with the empiricists, like Berkeley, who made the criticism of abstract ideas and the idea of matter, Hume's philosophy is to analyze what is in our mind, in the broad sense (ideas, trends, will , feelings, etc..), to analyze such concepts or principles (such as causality ). It is in this way, to discover the origin of perceptions of the mind, bringing them back to sense impressions that our ideas breed, since almost all our ideas are a reminder of old feelings, and to establish their relationship. Ultimately, these are the original prints that are given to us absolutely no one can always find out the origin. Hume studied mainly the ideas of relationship, and he maintains that apart from space and time given to us, relations have nothing objective, but are based primarily on the cognitive dispositions of a knower, provisions which must be a psychological study.

Establish principles

Experimenting

An example implementation of an experimental method in the field of human science is the analysis of the passions in Book II of the Treatise of human nature. Based on an analysis of some specific cases (the pride and humility), Hume built a theory of the passions. He then put to the test by examining more fully these two passions. Turning to other cases, he tries to show that we can extend this theory by making him undergo some corrections. The new cases fit well with theory. But apart from confrontation to a variety of cases that provides the experience , Hume offers his theory of experiments, developing experiments in which different thoughts circumstances related to the passions are subject to variation. These experiments allow both to confirm the validity of the theory that show that it can account for seemingly contrary cases. So not only is it the theory developed by induction, but its functionality (the mechanism to report any passion, even in problematic cases) is demonstrated.

Ideas: their origin and their relationship

Statue of David Hume in Edinburgh on the Royal Mile

Perceptions of the mind

Hume's point of departure of his investigation he means by the expression of perceptions of the mind , these perceptions are of two kinds:

• impressions: "The perceptions that come with greater force and violence, we can call them prints, and this term, I understand all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. "
• ideas: "By ideas I mean the pictures driving impressions in thinking and reasoning. Such, for example, all the perceptions excited by this speech, with the exception only of those from the sight and touch, and with the exception of immediate pleasure or inconvenience it may cause. "

This division is the difference between feeling and thinking, "Everyone, of itself, easily perceive the difference between feeling and thinking. "

Divisions perceptions of the mind

This division general perceptions of the mind does not recognize the different kinds of ideas and different kinds of impressions, or relationships that may exist between them. Hume introduced for this purpose a distinction between simple and complex idea idea:

"There is another division of our perceptions, which should be observed, and which extends both to our impressions and our ideas. It is the division between perceptions and perceptions SIMPLE COMPLEX. "

From this new Division, Hume examines the question of the relationship between these two kinds of ideas and impressions. All simple ideas come from simple impressions, while complex ideas can only be derived from simple ideas without coming directly from the experience.

Simple ideas

For Hume, all perceptions of the mind are first impressions, and their reality is not, strictly speaking, the object of knowledge: it is pure data of unknown causation. On this basis, the ideas seem to be forever, and be nothing other than reflections weakened impressions: although, according to the empiricist view, there is a natural transition between an impression and an idea (as show the dream and madness), the difference is clear and intuitively known. But it follows that the difference between impressions and ideas is not a difference of nature but of degree, the paper is stronger and vibrant than ideas.

It is from this conception of the idea that Hume attempts to demonstrate the first point, namely that the simple ideas are always simple impressions, and he uses it for the experiment: can we produce a simple idea that does not print? He suggested, attempting to resolve this issue, a thought experiment , illustrated by this picture:

Can we have the idea of missing the nuance, without having first impression?

Here is the answer to Hume's thought experiment that is to ask whether it is possible for a man to replace the particular shade by the imagination:

"Few people, I think, will agree that he can not, and this may serve as proof that simple ideas do not always derive the corresponding feelings, but the case is so unusual that it is hardly worthy of remark and that he does not deserve that, by itself, change our general maxim. "

The challenge of this experiment is whether or not there are innate ideas, and Hume's fundamental thesis is this:

"

The complex ideas and relationships

The ideas are not just inanimate objects of the mind, they appear in the imagination according to certain relationships and remarkable consistency with which most often make "intelligible". There are, for Hume, three basic relations, the causes in human nature remains unknown, and these relations are resemblance, contiguity and causation.

Impressions and ideas are the "atoms" ultimate, accessible reflection of the experience, the combination or merger is the entire empirical world, moral and intellectual. Impressions and ideas are thus the only source of our knowledge. Ultimately, for Hume, the whole philosophy, it includes the theory of human science, the philosophy of science and science itself, is reduced to the philosophy of mind .

Nominalism

The analysis of ideas led Hume to formulate a nominalist theory of abstract ideas and the notion of substance , this theory has an important role in examining the genesis of all our general ideas, whether through example, space and time , or the court.

According to Hume, every idea is a particular idea: when we are supposed to represent a general idea, or abstract, in the imagination , we conceive an idea derived from a specific impression. Therefore, we have no idea of the table in general, but we have an idea of this particular object (with a certain shape, a certain color, etc.).. The generality of the idea is a quality which is added, quality by which the mind is a collection of objects, impressions and therefore under the same term. This act of gathering is the effect of a habit of mind, when he notices some similarities between objects of experience.

Purpose of the science of human nature

This classification of the perceptions of the mind can enter the precise subject of the investigation Hume: Hume although qualifying as an empiricist and that quality may suggest that the thought of Hume is on external objects perceived by the senses As such, his philosophy is in fact in the examination and classification of perceptions of the mind and their relationships . But since Hume's fundamental thesis is that any simple idea comes from a feeling that goes with it, the entire investigation on human nature, more specifically, seeks to analyze the causal relationship between ideas and impressions in all fields, especially intellectual, moral and political

"Thus, we find that all our simple ideas and impressions resemble simple one another, and as the complex ideas and complex impressions are formed from them, we can say in general that these two kinds of perceptions are exactly. Having discovered this relation, which does not require further review, I am curious to find some of their other qualities. Consider what it is to their existence, and which, impressions and ideas are causes and which are effects.

The comprehensive review of this matter is the subject of this treaty and we will confine our comments to establish a single general proposition: that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which correspond to them and that they represent exactly. "

Divisions of the science of human nature

Having proposed a division of perceptions of the mind, Hume sets out the plan he will follow throughout the Treatise of human nature. It may seem logical , "said Hume, starting with the analysis of impressions, because first impressions are feeling in relation to ideas derived. However, there are two reasons not to follow this logic: first, the impressions of sensation are not of philosophy , but the physiology and the anatomy , second, the impressions of reflection (passions, emotions, etc..) occur as a result of ideas. In the philosophical, what are the ideas that come first:

"And as the impressions of reflection, namely, the passions, desires and emotions that deserve our attention mainly, mostly born of ideas, it will be necessary to reverse the method which at first sight seems most natural and to explain the nature and principles of the human mind attempts to explain how particular ideas, before we go to print. "

The plan will be the following: ideas, which are primarily copies of impressions of sensation are the subject of Book I of the Treatise of human nature, on the understanding. The impressions derived, that is to say, the impressions of impressions and perceptions of ideas, are the subject of books II (the passions) and III (on moral impressions).

The ideas of space and time

Knowledge

The concept of probability

Hume distinguishes between two ways of knowing: knowledge, own, and probability. The first concerns relations between ideas, while the second deals with matters of fact. This opposition is central to the philosophy Hume because it expresses the idea that empirical knowledge after our encounter with the world, can not be rationally justified to its foundations. The probability in this sense overlaps with the famous problem of causation, because, once skeptical criticism showed how our habit of associating causal events is not based on a rational basis, the solution is to trust our senses. Indeed, in most cases, that is to say with greater probability, they do not deceive us.

The causal relationship

When an event is the cause of another, we often think know what is the connection between the two terms of the causal connection supposed to follow the second term of the first. Now, says Hume, we perceive nothing in a series of events that the events that constitute, in other words, our knowledge of a necessary connection is not empirical. But where, apart from the perception , we could take this knowledge? Hume denies that we can have an idea of causation other than the fact that two events have always succeeded: we form a sort of anticipation that we represent the second term must occur when the first occurs. This constant conjunction of two events and the expectation or anticipation that results for us is all we can know the causality, ie, our ideas can not penetrate deeper into the nature of the relationship of cause and effect.

Anyway, the problem remains: what justifies our belief in the causal connection and how that connection is. For Hume, this belief is a kind of instinct , based on the development of our habits and our nervous system. This belief is ineliminable, but can not be proved by any kind of arguments (deductive or inductive).

Kant , who was "awakened from his dogmatic slumber" by this approach, used in inaugurating the transcendental theory in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Induction

We believe that the past is a reliable guide in relation to the future. For example, the laws of the orbits used to describe past behavior of planets , and hence we assume that these laws work equally well for future behavior. But how this principle of induction that we assume can it be justified? Hume suggests two possibilities but rejects them both.

• First, the future must resemble the past, and it derives from a need logic. But Hume noted that we can design a world where the irregular and chaotic future would have no point of comparison with the past, or more simply, a world like ours, regular until today, but then that would change completely. So there is no logical necessity in the principle of induction.
• The second justification is only dealing with the past reliability of induction: it has always worked before, so it will definitely work thereafter. But this justification is a petition of principle , because it uses induction to justify it.

For Hume, it seems we have an instinct that leads us to believe that the future will be like the past, based on instinct, habit, just like causality.

According to Karl Popper , Hume was the first to be well clarified the problem of induction, as Popper calls "the problem of Hume" .

The identity of the self

Personal identity is considered at the end of the first book, on the understanding of the Treaty of human nature. However, this review should be completed by the analysis of notions of pride and humility of Book II, on the passions, since these passions come in the genesis of the impressions we have of ourselves as individuals.

According to Hume, in the analysis of Paper I, we have no particular impression of me , but we report his ideas and impressions. Hume offers the following reasoning: the self is assumed to be stable and substantial, while all the impressions vary. There is no print from which we could derive a sense of self. The "me", if an idea is an idea fictitious.

This design breaks with the metaphysical classic, illustrated by the cogito Descartes , because it makes it impossible to establish the reality of a substance such as Spiritual ontological foundation, and it rejects the idea that the self is in us psychic reality and simple. This rejection is raised, it remains to Hume to reflect the reality of me, and to show its genesis: how the fictional idea of me she is born of the laws of the human psyche?

We tend to think we are still the same person , that our present self is the same as five years ago, despite the changes that affect many aspects of our personality. We could from there, seek the underlying self, which remains the same as other changes, and we ask what is its nature and what distinguishes it from accidents that affect us.

But Hume denies that we can make the slightest difference between me as mysterious and the changes they are said to belong to or arising. So when we look at ourselves, we can only perceive sets of ideas and feelings. So, given that the soul is something too subjective introspection never allows to collect a substance that we might call "ME".

The ego is nothing more than an aggregate of perceptions of, and, according to Hume, these perceptions as they pertain to anything up to me himself. The soul is thus a community that has a certain identity, not by virtue of its essence , but by changing the composition of elements continuously. The problem of ego identity is transformed, for Hume, in the unity of individual experience, because the mind can not grasp the true relationship would explain why certain sensations and not others form a compound called "me." The nature of that cohesion remains unexplained, and Hume, referring to his theory in the appendix to the Treaty, declare that this theory does not satisfy me completely. However, the reasons behind this dissatisfaction themselves are not clearly identified and remain a subject of perplexity to commentators.

Consideration of the ideas of religion

Miracles

Theme of miracles is considered by Hume in Section X of its Survey on Human Understanding. This is an opportunity for him to implement his vision empiricist functioning of human intelligence in order to prove the impossibility of miracle.

According to Hume , if experience suggests naturally a cause will always produce the same effect, and that the future will resemble the past, because we believe that the phenomena befall a probability: It is rare, but possible that a patient recovers ranked quadriplegic to walk, because it has already been observed. Conversely, if I drop a stone I held in my hand, it is certain that it will fall, because every time I ' did she fell, as has been observed by all mankind since the beginning of humanity. It is through this model we derive the so-called natural laws.

A miracle is something that goes against these laws (as, for example, the resurrection of a man), Hume says he is already, in this definition, impossible to believe. The laws of nature are indeed a high probability if (observed by all, at all times and in all places) they are a uniform final proof against miracles.

Moreover, it would be necessary to prove the existence of miracle, evidence to the contrary and higher than that of natural law, which requires evidence of a miracle that the falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact in question.

"When a man says he saw a dead man back to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it is more likely that this man was mistaken or he is wrong, or that it happened actually happened. I weigh the one against the other, the two . "

However, no human testimony can not meet this condition, because a miracle is never enough attested by men of knowledge, good sense and an education worthy of absolute trust, and these events are never quite public. In addition, under the miracle stories are mostly found among ignorant and barbarous nations, which form a further argument against them.

Finally Hume shows that the wonder and natural belief of man to the supernatural, when combined with the religious sentiment, announcing the end of "common sense". In this case, the testimony of man is worthless.

Hume concludes logically that one can not reasonably believe in miracles, and that a religion founded and affirmed by his miracles is nonsense (but he runs against the Christian religion, he said only by faith based personal).

Critique of teleology

Passions

According to the division of perceptions of the mind into impressions and ideas, Hume, after studying the understanding, a theory of passions , that is to say, secondary impressions. This division is recalled and developed in the first chapter of Book II of the Treaty . This division can be represented as follows:

                                              __
  Areas of original prints |
   Science | | | 
                       | | |
                       | | |
  Mind | Ideas | "Perceptions"
                       | | |
  Passions |  Impressions  | |
  moral side _ |
                                             

This division of ideas traces the Humean theory of the genesis of ideas, based on the first principle of human nature: "all our simple ideas derived from simple impressions that correspond to them and they are exactly" (based priority of impressions). Simple ideas and impressions first impressions still derive secondary themselves a source of new ideas. All these mental facts is designated by the word "perceptions" in Hume's philosophy.

The whole book on the passions II proposes to experimentally demonstrate a passion for describing the mechanics of the passions, to explain the causality of our actions and determine how the passions give some meaning to the existential world of experience, limited by space and time in which we live.

System of passions

All passions are simple and uniform for Hume . They are also prints of original existence, thereby escaping the realm of reason, as Hume will appear in detail in his analysis of desire.

Hume does not define the passions (which is impossible, since they are simple and original), but to describe the circumstances:

"

This description takes the form of a theory of relations between impressions, qualities, and articles about the qualities of passion. These concepts form a system, a term that refers not to a purely intellectual theory of the passions, but the empirical approach of Newton. Hume hopes to establish a system based on a small number of principles can account for the phenomena studied in the same way that scientists try to account for the mechanisms of nature does not multiplying the explanatory principles: it's about being frugal in assumptions and principles to confront the trials to confirm the accuracy of the system.

By quality, Hume means certain properties, such as beauty , capable of producing impressions on us . By subject, Hume refers to the object (thing, living thing) bearer of these qualities . Object of passion, Hume intends the object to which the passion is reported . For example, analyzing the passion of pride , Hume discerned the following conditions: a certain person should produce in us a feeling pleasant by any of its properties, a subject we must be connected in any way, so that a transition occurs between the sense of quality and our ego. This me, as it is well connected to quality, then the proper object of the passion of pride. Thus, ownership of property is worthy of praise for his owner a source of pride.

This analysis of pride and its opposite, humility enables Hume to show the transition mechanism that occurs in a dual relationship: a first relationship, printing, originally independent of the passion; a second relationship, idea, by which feeling is connected to the one who feels passion. The original sense is "transfused" of the subject to me. The absence of either of these relationships prevents or destroys passion. To confirm this theory of dual relationship, Hume multiplies the experiments, that is to say he invented situations by varying the elements that come in. These are experiments and experiences of thoughts that must show the adequacy of the system to describe the mechanisms that produce or prevent the production of a passion .

Will

The will and free choice or free will, are analyzed by Hume as passions. The discussion about freedom is the opportunity to establish the reasons for our actions and to describe the system of the passions in a way that is both dynamic .

The free will describe the property alleged human will to determine freely - and even arbitrarily - to act and think as opposed to determinism or fatalism, which asserts that the will is determined in each of his actions by forces including the need. The alternative posed by Hume is this: either we have no reason when we want, or the will is always determined. The first part of the alternative appears absurd, since it has the consequence that, if our will is free, then our volitions are the product of chance, and would we be crazy or irresponsible, and our actions will reflect nothing substantial or fundamental in us.

Hume's argument is thus that the doctrine of freedom of the will destroys morality, while we argue every day from the doctrine of necessity: we assume that in fact continually acts of others have motivation, and can not be otherwise if we assume that the behavior of others is understandable. Therefore, these acts are determined and specific to an individual according to his temperament and its provisions to that extent only, an individual can be blamed or praised.

Phenomenology of Space and Time

The passions do not just change our relationship to things , to ourselves and others. They have many effects on the actual conditions of the experiment are the time and space , and the perception we have. They give a dimension that Hume lived a few examples .

Thus, opposition from the top and bottom, as values , has she no objective basis: in fact involve humans in many cultures, the height with the nobility and power, and down with the baseness morality , weakness, etc.. No data from the experiment can not account for this way of feeling of space and to hold beliefs , some religious (Heaven vs. Hell). However, we can start our objective spatial situation, and note that our body has to work harder to climb (and still has this limitation, because we can not deliver us from the gravity ) than down (fall ). But the efforts we make in other areas, such intellectuals are associated with pleasure the year, excellence, enjoyment felt when performing a strenuous activity. The effort thus produces pleasurable passions.

"Anything that supports us and fills the passions is agreeable and, on the contrary, anything that diminishes or weakens them is unpleasant. As the opposition has the first effect and that the facility has the second, it is not surprising that in mind, in some provisions, the first and wants to have an aversion to the second. "

By transition, the top is then colored by these passions.

"Therefore, since the imagination, from bottom to top, is in its qualities and principles internal opposition and since the soul, when joy and courage to raise, finding a way opposition and eagerly throws himself into a theater of thought or action in which his courage will find something to eat and work, it follows that anything that gives strength to the soul, which animates everything either by touching the passions or whatsoever touching the imagination, communicates naturally fancy this inclination to rise and determined to go against the natural course of his thoughts and his ideas. This upward progress of the imagination to adapt this provision of the spirit, and the difficulty instead of extinguishing his vigor and alacrity, has the opposite effect, it supports and enhances. Virtue, genius, power and wealth are therefore associated with the height and the sublime as poverty, slavery and madness are linked to the descent and lowness. "

If you look at certain religious beliefs as the belief in angels, we see that these beliefs satisfy this pattern: the angels are purely high, where the height is natural, and are therefore an inversion our way of experiencing space. Hume thus suggests that superstitions are religious reflections of human existence.

Morality

Since Hume divides the perceptions of the mind, that is to say everything that we can have knowledge, impressions and ideas, it follows that morality is either a rational discernment (idea) or some feel that would be identified. To establish the second term of the alternative, it must suffice in the eyes of Hume, to refute the first hypothesis. Book III of the Treaty starts with a detailed refutation of rationalism in morals.

Criticism of moral rationalism

Hume offers two arguments to refute the theory that we distinguish or determine the good and evil with the help of reason . Both arguments are based on his theory of passions.

The first argument is to define the reason as a faculty of distinguishing truth and falsehood. However, right and wrong exist only through a relationship between the idea of an object and the print object. Hume defined passion as having a sense of original existence, it can not be related to anything other than itself. In other words, a passion is neither true nor false. The conclusion is therefore that reason can not account for moral impressions.

"Truth and falsehood consist of an agreement or disagreement with either the real relations of ideas, ie the actual existence of things and made real. So anything that is not likely that agreement or disagreement is not capable of being true or false and can not be an object of our reason. Now it is evident that our passions, our volitions and actions are not likely to agreement or disagreement because they are realities and facts originals, complete in themselves and that do not refer to other passions, volitions and actions. It is therefore impossible that they be reported or true or false and whether or contrary or conformable to reason. "

The second argument is to recall that reason, as Hume has shown in Book II of the Treatise of human nature, produces no action. Yet morality influence our passions and actions. So if this is the case, why can not determine good and evil in our actions.

"So all in all, it is impossible that the distinction between moral good and moral evil can be done by the right because this distinction has an influence on our actions and that reason alone can not. Reason and the trial may indeed be the indirect cause of action by encouraging a passion or by directing but that does not mean that a trial of this kind by its truth or falsity, is accompanied by virtue or vice. Concerning the decisions that are caused by our actions, they can still less give these moral qualities in actions are their causes. "

Since reason is impotent in practice, only an impression may qualify as moral sense. It is this status itself is in question here, the fact remains that the reason can discern what there may be moral, so moral sense, a-rational considered itself , is not necessarily irrational.

The moral sense

But against these attacks against the role of reason in assessing behavior, Hume argued that immoral conduct is not so great in opposing reason. He argues that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivated, since believing that killing is a crime, it thereby be motivated by an internal moral principle not to kill and blame the crime. He then notices that reason alone can not motivate, it only discovers the truths of fact and logic , and it depends only on our desires and preferences, whether those truths will motivate us to action.

Reason alone does not produce the belief morality. For Hume, morality rests ultimately on sense, reason being not only prepare the way for our judgments sensitive analysis of moral problems. These arguments against the rational foundations of morality have become antirealist arguments: for a moral fact, be a reality existing in the world and be a source of intrinsic motivation are two entirely different things. There is no reason to believe in the reality of moral facts.

Basis of socio-political morality

For Hume there is no society without moral grounds. If nature provides the matter, as our provisions and interest, the institution is that individuals can expand their horizons and morale is through education and the arts of politicians that our motives are eventually interpreted in a proper legal manner.

Origin of companies

In researching the origin of the moral sense of justice, Hume is led to exhibit a theory of the origin of society. For Hume, in fact, there is no justice without agreement. We must therefore first explain the origin of conventions, then explain to justice, and sense of justice that follows.

The origin of the conventions can not be in the eyes of Hume, purposes which is attributed to a corporation: it is absurd to think that companies have been created in order to enjoy certain benefits such as greater power an advantageous distribution of tasks and greater security of property, while these benefits are not known in a state of nature assumed (and Hume imagination and a philosophical interest almost zero). In the uncultivated state, man has indeed a very limited view of its existence and its relationship to others. He is unable to conceive spontaneously plan for a company that would bring the benefits he can not find the story anywhere in the state where it is located.

"To form a society, we must not only be beneficial but also that men are aware of these benefits and it is impossible that in their wild, uncultivated, they are never able, through study and thought sufficient to achieve this knowledge. "

Therefore that man finds these benefits without having sought. The origin of society and can not recover from a natural finality entered in man and that he would only have to learn and must be a natural impulse.

This origin is, for Hume, the sexual instinct. The attraction of the sexes and its consequences are in fact the only empirical data that explain why human beings can live together and not create even a rudimentary social life. Gold, this union were born children whose parents are concerned, and the unintended consequence is that children become aware of the benefits of such an association.

"This need is none other than the natural appetite between the sexes, which unites and preserves their union until you see a new link, the common interests of their offspring. "

Justice and Property

For Hume, taking awareness of the benefits of society , men understand that this is the only way to stabilize the property. The man, in fact, is in the following situation: on the one hand, he knows, in a supposed state of nature, his interest and that of his family, and this is for him all the moral : its own bias is his sense of morality, on the other hand, they possess external goods can be taken away by violence , and he can use violence to seize the property of others. Once discovered that the company can increase the enjoyment of property, the selfish nature does not disappear, but is logically greater satisfaction in establishing a common framework that can guarantee the property. This guarantee is what creates justice.

Rules of Property

It is through property that human relations will stabilize, allowing men to ensure their well, producing higher quality goods by the division of labor and to own more. But the institution of property, and justice, must still follow certain rules to satisfy human selfishness. Hume outlines several rules: the property must be made to transfer (trade).

The Promise

Besides the ownership and exchange, the company is also based on respect for the word. In this case, as in the preceding, it is impossible to suppose that men are not fair to assume what is to be demonstrated. To explain the promise, we must seek a reason to keep his promise that is not the sense of duty: on the contrary, for Hume, a sense of duty that must be explained by this reason.

Economy

David Hume was the first in his Essay on the Balance (1752), to describe the adjustment mechanism of gold stocks in a position of gold standard. Indeed, Hume criticizes the false fear of governments to escape in case of gold trade deficit. If all traders are using the gold standard, we have this diagram here: -> A country has a trade deficit (or trade surplus). -> You must set (or be adjusted) from the gold possessed. It therefore records the outputs (or inputs) of gold. -> According to the principle of the gold standard , then there is contraction of money supply (or increase) and thus lower prices (or increase). -> The country becomes more competitive in the international market as its prices are lower relative to the rest of the world (or vice versa). -> The balance of payments is rebalanced, with the same amount of gold at the beginning.

Aesthetics

History

Reception of Hume's thought

During his lifetime

After his death

The response from Kant to Hume is probably one of the most famous descendants of Hume. Following Kant, it has sometimes been considered that Hume's skepticism was passed once and for all. In this way, the naturalism and psychologism Hume are considered erroneous and represents a sort of necessary transition between the natural scientific mind (but inconsistent when he takes to be) and philosophy as science criticism. This contradiction has been variously used: Nietzsche sees an impossibility for the "right" to build itself or to justify; Husserl , on the contrary, in fact the enemy of his own method, to establish philosophy as rigorous science, the phenomenology.

In France , following Kant and the critique of Hume by Thomas Reid who saw him as a nihilist, the philosophy of Hume was rejected in the school sector, mainly due to the influence of the eclecticism of Victor Cousin.

In philosophy Anglo-Saxon , after a long period in which Hume was largely considered a subjectivist optionally sterile, a "New Hume" has emerged in the last twenty years of the ^twentieth century, "New Hume" which is characterized a realistic causal (as opposed to an interpretation projectionist) and has been shown recently by The New Hume Debate (see bibliography). The debate over Hume is thus still valid.

Works

ditions anglaises

• ( )

• ( , 1754-1762)
• (1757)

• London, T. Becket & PA De Hondt, 1766
  tr.fr.
• ( , dont , 1776)

• ( , 1783)

French translations

• , trad. anonyme, Amsterdam, Schreuder et Mortier, 1753
• , Paris, 1766
• , Paris, Lyon, 1767
• , traduction anonyme, dimbourg et Londres, 1779
• , traduction M. Campenon, Paris, Furne et Cie, 1839-1840
• (2 vol. : , , ) , trad. Maxime David, Alcan, Paris, 1912
• , 2 vol., trad. Andr Leroy, Aubier, 1946
• , trad. Andr Leroy, Aubier, Paris, 1947
• , trad. A.Leroy, Paris, Aubier, 1947
• , (bilingue), trad. Didier Deleule , Aubier, Paris, 1971
• , trad. anonyme, (Amsterdam, 1752), reproduite par R. Polin, Vrin , Paris, 1972.
• , traduction M. Malherbe , Paris, Vrin, 1971 et 1980
• , 4 tomes, trad. M. Malherbe , Paris, Vrin , 1973-1974
• , prface et notes tablies par J.-P. Clro, Caen, Universit de Caen , Centre de philosophie politique et juridique, 1986
• , traduction de M. Malherbe , Vrin , Paris, 1987

• , traduction P.Baranger et P.Saltel, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1991
• , traduction de JBStuart, Anabase, 1992
• ( 1752-1758), d. intgrale (16 essais), prcd de et suivi de , bilingue, trad., Fabien Grandjean, Trans-Europ-Repress, 1993
• , livre II : les passions + , trad. J.-P. Clro, Flammarion, GF, 1991
• , livre III : la morale, trad. de Philippe Saltel, Flammarion, GF, 1993
• , livre I : l'entendement + Appendice, trad de P. Baranger et P. Saltel, Flammarion, GF, 1995
• , traduction JBSuart et D'Alembert, Paris, Alive, 1998
• , trad. Rene Bouveresse , Flammarion, GF, Paris, 2000
• (intgral), trad. Gilles Robel, PUF, Paris, 2001
• (bilingue), trad. Michel Malherbe, Vrin, Paris, 2005
• (bilingue), trad. M.Malherbe, Vrin, Paris, 2008
• , trad. Magali Rigaill, Gallimard, coll. Folioplus Philosophie, 2009

Bibliography

Resources

• , dites par JW Davis, University of Western Ontario

Biography

• John Hill Burton, , 2 vol., Edinburgh, 1846
• Mossner EC, , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970

Studies

• DF Norton, , Cambridge, 1993
• G. Compayr, , Paris, 1873
• G. Lechartier, , Paris, 1900
• Lucien Lvy-Bruhl , Orientation de la pense de D.Hume , in Revue de mtaphysique et de morale , 1909
• A. Leroy, , Paris, Alcan, 1929
• J. Laporte, Le scepticisme de Hume , in a href = "Revue_philosophique" class = "new" title = "Philosophical Magazine (non-existent page)"> Philosophical Review, 1933, 1934
• G. Berger, "Husserl and Hume", in International Review of Philosophy , 1939
• G. Deleuze , Empiricism and Subjectivity, Paris, PUF, 1953
• A. Leroy, David Hume, PUF, Paris, 1953
• O. Brunet, Philosophy and Aesthetics in David Hume, Paris Nizet, 1965
• J. Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971
• Mr. Malherbe, empiricist philosophy of David Hume, Paris, Vrin, 1976
• J. Harrison, Hume's Moral Epistemology, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976
• D. Deleule, Hume and the birth of economic liberalism, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1979
• JL Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, London, Routledge, 1980
• Mr. Malherbe, Kant or Hume, Paris, Vrin, 1980
• G. Boss , The difference of philosophies - Hume and Spinoza, Zurich, Grand Midi, 1982
• Y. Michaud, Hume and the end of philosophy, Paris, PUF, 1983
• JP Clro, The Philosophy of Hume's passions, Paris, Klincksieck, 1985
• E. The Jall, Hume and the moral regulation, Paris, PUF, Philosophies, 1999
• R. Read and KA Richman (ed.), The New Hume Debate (revised edition), Routledge, 2007
• C. Gautier, Hume and knowledge of history, Paris, Vrin, 2005

Notes References

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